[Mesajul iniĊ£ial al lui "S"]
Article 5529 of soc.culture.romanian:
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From: an54723@anon.penet.fi
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Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 00:58:28 UTC
Subject: A look at the 1989 Romanian Revolution
Lines: 235
4 years after the Revolution one can only sympathize with the people's
frustration in seeing the former communists and "Securitate" ( secret political
police under communists ), not only in high governmental and managerial
positions, but also becoming the new rich and capitalists. It is especially
painful for the heroes of the Revolution who braved bullets,( many of them being
wounded and killed ) and for their families. But those understandable human
emotions should not lead to confusion between crime and political activity ( as
wrong as it might be ), between anti-communism and democracy, between revenge
and justice, between national enemies and political adversaries, between
people's afiliations in the past and their record since in power. Nor should
this lead to an ideological test of who is a "true" Romanian or to justify
personal acts such as suicide. In an effort to clarify those issues we should
analize the events from a historic point of view.
One of the pecularities of the Romanian communism was its degeneration
into the Ceausescu & wife personal dictatorship. For once, only a totalitarian
form of government like communism could produce and maintain in power such
ubuesque figures( the Western "real politik" helped a bit too! ). By mid 1970's,
or early 1980's the real Communist Party, as a political and ideological entity,
has virtually disapeared( except for very few people such as Brucan, Iliescu,
etc. ) not only under the reality of political and economical situation, but
also as a deliberate victim of the Ceausescus. Ceausescu deviated from all
the percepts of communism except totalitarian tyranical control, transforming
the political system into a form of personalized oriental despotism and the
economic system into some form of poorly run monopolist state capitalism
whose purpose was the global exploitation of the population to finance
pharaonic projects. He was extremely careful to stifle any institution or
person who might achieve any prestige, and thus, be a potential opponent.
PCR ( the Romanian Communist Party ) under Ceausescu was marked by the effective
purge of the "old communists" ( accused of being filo-Stalin, filo-Russian,
filo-Gheorghiu-Dej ), the promotion of opportunists, and the transformation of
the party from a political and ideological organization into a mass structure,
whose only purpose was to implement the whims and policies of the dictator.
( One has only to take a look at the situation in the neighboring European
communist countries to see that such developments did not take place there, or
occured to a significantly smaller degree ). Understanding this peculiar
development with the PCR is the key to understanding the somehow paradoxal
developments during and after the Romanian Revolution of 1989.
For once, the communist parties in neighboring countries maintained some will of
their own and once they became fully aware of the new political and economic
realities and prospects, all they needed was a relatively small push to accept
the unavoidable. Thus the revolutions there were peaceful transfers of power.
PCR, being nothing more than an execution organ of the Ceausescu's and an
artificial structure, could provide no restraining or political alternative,
nor did it have the will ( or any will, either way ) to do anything. Thus,
given Ceausescu's resolve to resist, the path to a peaceful transition was
closed and the bloodshed followed.
The Romanian Revolution started with Dec. 16, 1989 revolt in Timisoara and
ended with the 1st coming of the miners to Bucharest( "mineriada" ) to help
put down a revolt, in the summer of 1990( that event made it clear to a
majority of the people that political changes will likely no longer happen by
revolution, but by elections; it also made clear to the government and police,
when and what constitutes ( and what does not ) legitimate use of force to
establish public order). For purpose of analysis, the revolution can be
decomposed ( arbitrarily and subjectively, of course ) in several stages.
The popular demonstrations of Timisoara and Bucharest resulted in bloodshed
due to the army shooting the demonstrators. However, they achieved their goal
of inspiring courage, breaking the cycle of fear and the feelings of impotence,
raising the ante for the security forces by forcing them to use force rather
than just intimidation to protect the dictator, and finally, shaking the system
from its lethargy enough to make a change possible. The second and by far more
controversial stage was the complex political realignment that took place on
the night of 21st Dec( following the massacre in Bucharest ) and on the 22nd
December. The "old communists", remnants of the ideologically meaningful PCR,
were influential enough to convince the Securitate forces not to protect the
Ceausescu's and let them fall. This complex deal involving Iliescu, Brucan
and others ( organized as FSN ) the Securitate forces and the army crystalized
over the few coming days. Of course, that represented the stealing of the
revolution by the "old guard". On the other hand, it provided a point of
stability and focus, prevented complete anarchy and the country falling apart,
provided a government that the people, the army and ultimately the Securitate
forces temporarily trusted and followed; young idealistic heroes being massacred
in the streets, could not, by themselves, achieve this; it is only the coalition
of all those forces that made the Revolution successful. The official PCR,
custom made to serve Ceausescu and nothing more, disappeared with him, over
night( this is not what happened to the PC of neighboring countries which
officially survived and, more or less, transformed themselves). The third
stage is the "mini civil war" from Dec 23 to Dec 27 or so. The Securitate
forces have stayed mostly passive as the people and the army ( who, by then,
had switched sides ) were deposing the Ceausescu's. But with Ceausescu
fallen, the popular anger was directed against the main pillar of his
support, the Securitate. Fearing the wrath of the people and summary execution,
the Securitate forces organized a military resistance to the Revolution, some
to get time to leave the country, others to force the government to guarantee
to them their well being. It is doubtful that this resistance was meant to
bring Ceausescu back to power, but it is conceivable, that in order to save
their skin, the Securitate forces might have done such a thing. The resistance
eventually subsided following Ceausescu's execution and the promiss of clemency
toward the Securitate forces. It is this complex game that prevented the viguros
prosecution of the people who killed demonstrators subsequently: both the
army and the Securitate have fought on both sides. The army had done most of
the killings on Ceausescu's behalf; yet its switching sides assured the success
of the Revolution. The Securitate was also instrumental in the success: during
the critical 24 hrs. period starting the evening of Dec 21st it did not protect
the dictator thus allowing the Revolution to triumph. The next stage marks the
beginning of the foundations of the political system, ending with the first
elections. It is during this stage that the revolution changes its character
from anti-Ceausescu and anti-dictatorial to anti-communist and pro-democratic.
It is also the beginning of multi-party system, free press, individual freedoms,
small economic changes. The instability continued, but by in large, the National
Salvation Front ( FSN ) consolidated its power and triumphed in the elections
partly due to its perceived handling of the Revolution, partly due to control
over the media, and in great part due to the mistakes, inexperience, extremism,
demagoguery, disunity in the opposition.
Why did the FSN( and later FDSN ) win the elections twice in a row ? Of course,
being in power and controling the media ( mainly TV ) helped quite a bit. But,
in fairness, throughout Europe, the official TV is controlled and financed by
governments; and the party in power always enjoys some unfair electoral
advantage. Yet, the opposition can and often does unseat the government.
The easiest way is to blame conspiration ( "those evil neo-communists" ),
technicalities( control of the media ), the "people's stupidity ( "how dare
they not listen to us ?" ), anything, but face to its own mistakes. Let us
just compare the political positions:
1. Direction of change. What FSN/FDSN understood and the opposition did not,
was that the Romanian people want to live not the interwar Romania, but in a
modern Western European style welfare state. So, while the government was
talking about how do we get from here to there, some of the opposition seemed
caught in the past: "historic" parties, 1930 nostalgia, church and religion,
Antonescu, monarchy, communist atrocities in the 1950s and such. A small, but
relevant example of being out of touch is the name that Mr. Coposu chose for
his party PNTCD ( National Peasant Party, Christian and Democrat ). First it
evokes the past (PNT) instead of the future. The name "National" is a liability
at a time when the world is going international and when Ceausescu used
nationalism as a diversion; at a minumum looks void of meaning. "Peasant" is
even worse: it reminds of a time when the country was essentially agricultural
and when peasants formed a numeric majority; demagogue politicians would claim
to represent them to get their votes. The word "Peasant" when associated with
a person is pretty much an insult aluding to bad taste, lack of manners, low
class, and such. Anyway in two consecutive elections the party did not win the
peasant vote. The word "Christian" is also hardly likely to help with votes
in a world that is going more secular and in a country that anyway is
overwhelmingly christian. The "Christian Democrat" syntagm evokes Italy and
Germany, neither of which has been particularly helpful to Romania lately.
So, while the name is just a name, on some plane it shows a way of thinking.
( Mr. I. Ratiu bow tie is yet another example of being out of touch ).
As another example, the electorate saw the difference between the Ceausescu's
PCR and the group of former communists that formed the FSN and accepted that
those individuals might have been reformed, the same way as the Polish or
Lithuanian former communists. The opposition failed to see that, and
concentrated on attacking them based on their past afiliations, not present
actions.
2. Pace of reform. FSN/FDSN sensed that the country was exhausted after
Ceausescu's disastrous period and advocated slow gradual changes. The
opposition was for fast change, based not on asking the people what they think,
but on an ideological driven desire to disband communism as fast as possible.
Experience shows that countries that followed the fast transition model
(Poland, Russia ) ended up with either the communists back in power, or with
a rise in fascist extremism.
3. Demagoguery. While widely practiced by FSN/FDSN as well, some positions
supported by the opposition were absurd. Declaring the 48 year rule of the
communists illegal and cancelation of all the legislation and acts ( that
would probably anull all the graduation certificates and diplomas issued by
communist schools; marriage certificates as well ); evictions from apartments;
cancelations of pensions; declaring the communist regime criminal and, by
association, everyone who served it; revenge trials; banning of political
parties; banning of people from running in elections; etc. The government
took the high road and preached unity, reconciliation and forgiveness; the
opposition looked as it was looking for revenge, scape goats, punishments,
culpabilization, division. The opposition asked for justice, the government
asked for pragmatism.
4. Romanian emigration. After the fall of communism, scores of dubious
individuals returned from the West to preach democracy and western values and
claimed positions and functions in government, church, etc. On a more serious
note, the Romanian emigration failed to see the difference between country
and government, taking a position of enmity rather than loyal opposition to
the government. Many in the internal opposition took a similar position.
Of course, this always hurts the people not the government who now could blame
foreign policy failures and economic shortages on the opposition's activity in
foreign capitals. Since most of other emigrations supported their original
countries, the badly needed but scarce western investment went there (e.g.
Hungary ) rather than to Romania. It took some time before the opposition
saw the light and changed its position on foreign help to Romania.
5. External factors. The West was totally unprepared to face the collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe, and even less ( if imaginable ) to deal with
differences between countries, who from out there, they all look the same.
Romania appeared as an odd, primitive and violent place, the only one with
a bloody revolution. Historic talk about the Byzantium and Ottoman Empires
which would put Eastern Orthodox Romania on the non-europeean part of the
border did not help either, and made Romania look even more remote from
the Catholic and Protestant West. To limit the aid, the West started seeing
differences between "Central" Europe and "Eastern" Europe, an unfair and
dangerous double tier system. Of course, the predominance of former communists
in the government did not help at all. At any rate, the opposition was seen
as associated to this unfriendly West. The first coming of the miners to
Bucharest seemed to have been supported by a majority of the Romanians who
saw it as being necessary due to the immaturity of the law and order forces
in dealing with a large rebellious and violent crowd. The West saw it as a
Nazi style stormtroopers assault against a western style loyal and peaceful
opposition. The misunderstanding gap opened even wider.
6. Revolutionary credentials. Whether deserved or not, the people saw Iliescu
as leading during the revolution. Should the revolution fail and Ceausescu
regain control, Brucan, Iliescu and the FSN leaders would have been executed.
The same cannot be said with certainty about the leaders of the opposition.
7.Dubious behavior. How could parties that claim to be democratic take the
attitude that the people were stupid for not giving them their votes ? Or by
claiming that people are like sheep and therefore control of the media equates
to control of the people ? ( Of course, if this is true today, it must have
been true in the 1920s and 1930s, which casts doubt about that "democracy" ).
Did they expect the peasants to vote for them after calling them stupid ?
Why did the ex-King seem to want to visit only at times of increased
discontention ? How about the Marin Munteanu episode, hailed as a national
hero, just to turn out later that he exhibited neo-Nazi ideology? This kinds
of behavior raise the questions of committement to democracy at a time when
being anti-communist is not the same with being pro-democracy.
To conclude this historic review: the current Romanian government has many
problems: inability to keep up the pace of economic reform, unholly aliances
with extremist parties, despicable choice of director for the television
resulting in biased programming, secret service outside effective
parliamentary supervision, failure to prosecute "various" crimes, etc.
However, the criticism is directed toward their current activity not their
persons or past afiliations. If the opposition wants to be successful and
implement the ideas of the 1989 Revolution, it has to show fair-play ( even
if the other side does not ) and play the political game according to
the rules of democracy ( even if this results in loosing or not gaining power ).
** S. **
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Article 5533 of soc.culture.romanian:
Newsgroups: soc.culture.romanian
Path: CC.UMontreal.CA!IRO.UMontreal.CA!clouso.crim.ca!crim!hancu
From: hancu@crim.ca (Marius Hancu)
Subject: Re: A look at the 1989 Romanian Revolution
In-Reply-To: an54723@anon.penet.fi's message of Sat, 25 Dec 1993 00:58:28 UTC
Message-ID:
Sender: news@clouso.crim.ca (NEWS clouso)
Nntp-Posting-Host: odo.crim.ca
Organization: CRIM (Centre de Recherche Informatique de Montreal)
References: <010303Z25121993@anon.penet.fi>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 13:52:50 GMT
>>>In article <010303Z25121993@anon.penet.fi>, an54723@anon.penet.fi writes:
>> it also made clear to the government and police,
>> when and what constitutes ( and what does not ) legitimate use of force to
>> establish public order).
I am quite convinced they knew that already.
>> controversial stage was the complex political realignment that took place on
>> the night of 21st Dec( following the massacre in Bucharest ) and on the 22nd
>> December.
I would be interested in details on this, as I was in Canada at the
time, and the only information showed was the large meeting in the
Piata Palatului, where Ceausescu was booed, turned pale and cleared
out. Hours later, it was announced that he had fled.
I did not read anything about the massacre in Bucharest leading to
this meeting. Of course, I saw on TV all the "anti-terrorist" fighting
in the days that followed, but the sequence of events in Bucharest at
the beginning of the revolution is not very clear, as the Western
media did not have access yet.
>> the critical 24 hrs. period starting the evening of Dec 21st it did not protect
>> the dictator
What exactly happed at that time is very confusing, like the Gen.
Vasile Milea episode.
>> 2. Pace of reform. FSN/FDSN sensed that the country was exhausted after
>> Ceausescu's disastrous period and advocated slow gradual changes. The
>> opposition was for fast change, based not on asking the people what they think,
>> but on an ideological driven desire to disband communism as fast as possible.
>> Experience shows that countries that followed the fast transition model
>> (Poland, Russia ) ended up with either the communists back in power, or with
>> a rise in fascist extremism.
I agree with respect to Poland, I would be very reluctant to say that
the Russians followed a fast pace to reform. For them, perhaps;
comparatively with other countries, no.
>> 4. Romanian emigration. After the fall of communism, scores of dubious
>> individuals returned from the West to preach democracy and western
values and
>> claimed positions and functions in government, church, etc. On a more serious
>> note, the Romanian emigration failed to see the difference between country
>> and government, taking a position of enmity rather than loyal opposition to
>> the government. Many in the internal opposition took a similar position.
>> Of course, this always hurts the people not the government who now could blame
>> foreign policy failures and economic shortages on the opposition's activity in
>> foreign capitals.
I have to agree to this paragraph.
Since most of other emigrations supported their original
>> countries, the badly needed but scarce western investment went there (e.g.
>> Hungary ) rather than to Romania. It took some time before the opposition
>> saw the light and changed its position on foreign help to Romania.
Let's not forget about the size of the external romanian community.
The Hungarians fled by the millions in 1956, while the Romanian
community is much smaller and relatively recent.
This does not mean at all that I support having a larger Romanian
diaspora, not at all. Emigrating is a highly personal decision, and not an
easy one.
>> Of course, the predominance of former communists
>> in the government did not help at all.
I agree with this. I was in Japan at that time, and the image was
quite bad.
>> The first coming of the miners to
>> Bucharest seemed to have been supported by a majority of the
Romanians
Are you talking about the one in June of '90? That I highly doubt ...
>> 7.Dubious behavior. How could parties that claim to be democratic take the
>> attitude that the people were stupid for not giving them their votes ? Or by
>> claiming that people are like sheep and therefore control of the media equates
>> to control of the people ? ( Of course, if this is true today, it must have
>> been true in the 1920s and 1930s, which casts doubt about that "democracy" ).
>> Did they expect the peasants to vote for them after calling them stupid ?
Absolutely. And let's not forget that Iliescu was seen as implementing
the land reform. He really had the cards stacked for him.
All in all, an interesting and more penetrating review, even if I do not
agree with all the points.
Marius Hancu
------------
--
Marius Hancu, Parallel Architectures Group
Centre de Recherche Informatique de Montreal (CRIM)
1801, avenue McGill College, Bureau 800, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2N4, Canada
phone: (514) 398-5561, fax: 514-398-1244, email: hancu@crim.ca
Article 5537 of soc.culture.romanian:
Newsgroups: soc.culture.romanian
Path: CC.UMontreal.CA!roscai
From: roscai@ERE.UMontreal.CA (Rosca Ioan)
Subject: Acum 4 ani, 26 decembrie...
Message-ID:
Sender: news@cc.umontreal.ca (Administration de Cnews)
Organization: Universite de Montreal
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 1993 10:56:08 GMT
Lines: 161
Eliminarea lui Nicolae Ceausescu a declansat doua fenomene cu sens
inversat, dar cu efect nociv insumat: membrii retelei securicomuniste
s-au solidarizat, incetind infruntarea ; in schimb unitatea ce legase
participantii la revolta, pentru numai citeva zile, s-a dezintegrat ...
Pentru acest dublu proces nefast de recristalizare, 26 Decembrie
1989 are o semnificatie deosebita.
Pe de o parte, e prima zi de "pace" dupa "razboiul" cu "teroristii"
incetat ca prin farmec in urma debarasarii de cuplul buclucas... In
mod evident un armistitiu s-a incheiat, sau s-a trecut la o noua etapa a
unui scenariu ascuns, dar intuibil.
Nu vreau sa vorbesc despre acest subiect pentru ca, pe de o parte, ma
consider lipsit de informatiile necesare, si pe de alta parte, sint
impotriva obsesiilor anecdotice, care mascheaza esenta politica a
evenimentelor.
Cunosc prea multi "analisti" ce se ratacesc in rebusistica
intortocheata legata de comunism si de revolutie reusind sa
estompeze evidentele transparen-te bunului simt si sa trateze una din
cele mai monstruoase crime (boli) ale umanitatii in termenii si cu
modelul adaptat aventurilor picante sau exercitiilor de analitism.
De fapt obiectivele , resursele si structura "monstruoasei coalitii"
impotriva unei autentice revolutii sint transparente.
In schimb simbolistica zilei de 26 decembrie pentru celalalt proces ,
de destramare a pactului dintre revoltati, e mai putin cunoscuta si
analizata. Intervin asadar pentru ca presupun ca multi dintre cei aflati
atunci departe de tara nu stiu ca in aceasta zi, acum 4 ani, s-a facut
prima incercare de denuntare publica a masinatiei "FSN-iste" ,primul
apel la insurgenta contra dibacilor "emanati". Unii dintre disperatii
ce-si depasisera instinctul de securitate (...!) sfidind masina de
represiune pe 21 si 22 decembrie, s-au simtit tradati grav de strecura-
rea Tovarasilor la cirma "salvarii nationale" si au lansat in Bucuresti
manifeste chemind la un miting de protest si la rezistenta.
Apelul a fost primit cu reticenta, neincredere si aversiune. Cine a trait
tensiunea , emotia si confuzia ce paralizase Bucurestiul acelor zile nu
are nevoie de explicatii privind motivul acestei respingeri. Pentru
ceilalti, sugerez atmosfera cu doua esantioane :
1.Cu o viteza sugestiva, s-a raspindit zvonul ca apelul e opera
"teroristior" ce incearca sa atraga populatia intr-o cursa criminala. (In
ciuda dezorganizarii generale, zvonurile se propagau cu o
profesionala precizie formind un "brum" de o profesionala calitate
,ce a inecat orice semnal util).
2 Dizidenti notorii ce fusesera "integrati" propagandistic in
structurile aparente ale noii puteri, au facut apel pe canalele de radio-
tv la calm si la boicotarea mitingului incitator, denuntat ca o perfida
provocare.( Ulterior Doina Cornea avea sa-si exprime regretul pentru
aceasta gafa, pe care, cu onestitatea-i iesita din comun, a pus-o pe
seama naivitatii politice abil manipulate de putere).
Una peste alta, mitingul nu a mai avut loc... Prima confruntare a fost
aminata. Puterea a cistigat un timp de manevra atit de necesar in
vederea intimpinarii ei !
Dincolo insa de intriga acestei zile, se cuvine sa observam fenomenul
dramatic pe care il inaugureaza :scindarea rindurilor revoltei din
decembrie. Aceasta "despartire a apelor" era insa, din pacate,
inevitabila, iar momentul in care s-a produs nu e nici el intimplator.
Disparitia Ceausestilor scotea automat din starea de revolta mai
multe categorii de participanti, lasind in cursa doar membrii altora.
Care sint aceste categorii? Cum s-au scindat in continuare filoanele
lor?
A.
Prima mare bifurcare care a avut loc a trebuit sa anuleze o alaturare
conjuncturala :cea dintre DISPECERII si PROFITORII sistemului ,
nemultumiti (sau ingrijorati) de prestatia dementa a liderului lor si
VICTIMELE incarcerate in sistem, aduse la capatul rabdarii. Din
chiar clipa eliminarii lui Ceausescu, aceste doua parti participante la
rasturnare s-au pomenit reasezate fata-n fata: unii ca sa salveze
lagarul, ceilalti ca sa-l desfiinteze (pe prima reduta); primii ca sa-si
pastreze privilegiile si intr-un nou sistem ,ceilalti ca sa nu permita
aceasta napirlire (pe o a doua reduta); unii ca sa obtina linistea
amneziei, ceilalti ca sa recucereasca pacea dreptatii (pe o a treia).
Acest conflict este si azi AXUL CRIZEI ROMANESTI.
B.
A doua separare care a imputinat dramatic rindurile revolutionare a
fost cea dintre frustratiile predominant materiale, intelectuale sau
morale. Revolutia burtii nu putea sa aiba acelasi orar cu cea a
spiritului sau a demnitatii, caci se supunea unor determinari
semnificativ diferite.
Era mai mult decit firesc ca victimele revoltate doar de nivelul de
viata dramatic la care fusesera aduse sa se opreasca din drum, sa intre
intr-o stare de asteptare ingaduitoare.
Noii veniti trebuiau sa fie lasati sa-si arate intentiile, sa-si precizeze
oferta. Provenienta si principiile lor politice nu contau atit timp cit
PLATEAU BINE.
Epopeea minerilor este extrem de expresiva in acest sens.
(OBSERVATIE.
Putem numi "realism" aceasta atitudine si incerca sa atenuam
senzatia de penibil pe care o produce manifestarea ei prea
...indecenta, aducind corectii estetice diverse. Putem deasemenea sa o
investim cu autoritatea noii paradigme a adevaratului tehnocrat, fiinta
care obtine maximul de eficacitate ,in orice conditii...
Sint insa silit sa atrag atentia colegilor mei ale caror postinguri
denota aderarea la principiul rentabilitatii, al primordialitatii
economicului, etc, ca risca sa savirseasca (datorita distantei ...) ,prin
aplicarea acestor principii la realitatea romaneasca actuala o tripla
eroare :
1.pe plan moral , savirsind o impietate fata de martirii atacului
comunist si fata de supravietuitorii lui ,victime inca... Contest
acceptabilitatea unei "analize obiective" a carei concluzie este perfect
convenabila unor criminali nepedepsiti.
2.pe plan pragmatic, crezind in viabilitatea constructiilor noi pe
temelii vechi si eludind necesitatea operatiilor de demolare
3.Pe plan teoretic, aplicind un model al "rentabilitatii" fara a face
verificarile necesare privind adaptarea lui la realitatea pe care
pretinde ca o explica ; eludind de exemplu criteriile...
As dori ca tonul neretinut iritat al acestei observatii sa nu fie
interpretat ca un atac la modelele altora. Apartin categoriei celor ce
admit pluralitatea personalitatilor umane si a modelelor de lucru. Nu
imi este straina nici constienta relativitatii.
In viziunea MEA insa, Binele nu este emancipat, ci degradat de
relativitate. Iar Raul este pur si simplu nerelativ- cel comunist in
orice caz!)
C.
In sfirsit Opozitia, (adica revoltatii nesatisfacuti de evolutia politica a
tarii) s-a rupt in doua :"pasivii" (simpatizantii, suporterii,
observatorii, prudentii, snobii, fricosii, foarte ocupatii profesional,
dezgustatii, scepticii) si "activii". (Voi reveni la acest punct.)
D.
La rindul acestora cei activi s-au divizat in trei filoane ce s-au
complacut intr-un divort pagubos pentru cauza pe care o aparau :
"politicii", "intelectualii" si "furiosii strazii. (Voi reveni pe larg).
Fapt curios , ocultat si semnificativ : lupta a fost data de strada si
"chibitata" de partide si de "instantele critice"...!
La 26 Decembrie "strada" a facut primul apel in gol deschizind o
lunga serie de actiuni disperate, la care celelalte doua filoane au
reactionat cu inertie, prudenta, si moliciune inteleapta. Voi incerca sa
comemorez seria acestor dramatice nesincronizari, drumul care a dus
pina la urma la marginalizarea filonului radical al revolutiei antico-
muniste, ezitarile si retragerile care au facut ca fermitatea sa poata fi
numita extremism.
Ma simt obligat la o astfel de "parcurgere", la o reflectare de evolutie
deoarece observ ca, proiectate in planul "analizelor globale"
fenomenele sint deformate in numele sintezei , iar explicatiile nu mai
tin de istorie, ci de speculatie logica. Ori acolo, acasa, unii au
participat si participa inca atit de total, incit merita mai mult decit o
eticheta.
Cine sint asadar cei ce au continuat starea de isurgenta dupa 22
decembrie , deranjind baletul puterii si somnul "refacator" al grosului
populatiei?
Cine sint cei ce s-au incapatinat sa nu inteleaga ca singura
modalitate de refacere a Romaniei este galopul lin ,realist si
consensual (evitind dereglarile pe care le-ar produce productivitatii
nationale incapatinarea de a face dreptate) catre binefacerile societatii
de consum? Ce simt? Ce gindesc? Am cunoscut, am indragit si am
apartinut acestui grup, si mi-am propus sa il explic, asa cum l-am
inteles.
Va asigur ca printre ei erau multi fosti membri de partid ,ceea ce nu-i
impiedica sa-si racoreasca febra de adevar si dreptate cu incantatia:
Jos comunismul!
Article 5538 of soc.culture.romanian:
Newsgroups: soc.culture.romanian
Path: CC.UMontreal.CA!IRO.UMontreal.CA!clouso.crim.ca!crim!hancu
From: hancu@crim.ca (Marius Hancu)
Subject: Re: Acum 4 ani, 26 decembrie...
In-Reply-To: roscai@ERE.UMontreal.CA's message of Mon, 27 Dec 1993 10:56:08 GMT
Message-ID:
Sender: news@clouso.crim.ca (NEWS clouso)
Nntp-Posting-Host: odo.crim.ca
Organization: CRIM (Centre de Recherche Informatique de Montreal)
References:
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 1993 14:56:51 GMT
>>>In article , roscai@ERE.UMontreal.CA (Rosca Ioan) writes:
>> Sint insa silit sa atrag atentia colegilor mei ale caror postinguri
>> denota aderarea la principiul rentabilitatii, al primordialitatii
>> economicului, etc
Am impresia ca multe din post-urile care ar cadea sub incidenta
acestei aluzii (inclusiv ale mele) cautau nu atat sa accentueze
preponderenta factorilor economici, ci sa sustina ca neglijarea in
continuare a economiei de catre romani in general in presa, in
luarile lor de pozitie, indiferent de coloratura lor politica, nu fac
decat sa ii puna intr-o situatie neta de inferioritate pe piata
mondiala, unde vor continua sa actioneze ca diletanti si parteneri
minori. Romanii vor trebui sa invete sa produca la standardele
mondiale, sa reduca gargara politica si sa puna umarul in domeniul
practic.
Sunt destui care o fac deja.
>> 1.pe plan moral , savirsind o impietate fata de martirii atacului
>> comunist si fata de supravietuitorii lui ,victime inca... Contest
>> acceptabilitatea unei "analize obiective" a carei concluzie este perfect
>> convenabila unor criminali nepedepsiti.
Ma indoiesc ca o majoritate a populatiei Romaniei doreste o
re-judecare a trecutului in tribunale. Daca Manea Manescu, Nicu
Ceausescu si sefii securitatii au scapat basma curata, ce sa mai
vorbim de altii mai marunti.
Ce sa mai vorbim de alegerea lui Paunescu in parlament ...
Uita-ti-va la Franta si la Germania, unde la zeci de ani de la razboi
acceptarea colaborationismului cu fascistii nu exista in mare masura.
Majoritatea romanilor au fost implicati in instaurarea si conservarea
comunismului, fie direct fie indirect (prin pasivitate). Idem in toate
tarile Est-Europene. Faptul ca rusii au venit cu forta e primordial,
dar sa nu ne scutim de responsabilitate.
Majoritatea populatiei in Romaniei vrea in momentul de fata pace
interna si bunastare. Cei ce vor neglija acest aspect sunt condamnati
la esec politic, oricata dreptate ar avea pe plan ideal.
>> 2.pe plan pragmatic, crezind in viabilitatea constructiilor noi pe
>> temelii vechi si eludind necesitatea operatiilor de demolare
Demolarea in domeniul economic va incepe in mod natural cand
privatizarea va incepe serios. Din fericire, guvernul a fost obligat
de IMF si de presiunile interne sa accelereze acest proces, pe care
se pare ca nu il dorea de loc.
>> 3.Pe plan teoretic, aplicind un model al "rentabilitatii" fara a face
>> verificarile necesare privind adaptarea lui la realitatea pe care
>> pretinde ca o explica
Daca economia romaneasca nu devine eficienta si rentabila, intreaga
populatie va avea de suferit. Romanii trebuie sa inceteze sa traiasca
exclusiv in politica. Daca vor sa faca politica, sa abordeze si
problemele economice.
>> Fapt curios , ocultat si semnificativ : lupta a fost data de strada si
>> "chibitata" de partide si de "instantele critice"...!
Din pacate in momentul revolutiei, majoritatea politicienilor cu
experienta, managerilor cu experienta, militarilor cu experienta,
securistilor cu experienta, etc, etc, faceau parte din vechiul sistem.
Au stiut sa analizeze cu mai multe miscari inainte decat adevaratii
revolutionari, au profitat de o retea mai bine organizata si au
reusit sa se mentina la conducere.
Neglijarea si minimizarea "analizelor" nu va face decat sa mentina opozitia in
diletantism. Asta e valabila si cu privire la neglijarea sondajelor de
opinie publica.
Marius Hancu
--
Marius Hancu, Parallel Architectures Group
Centre de Recherche Informatique de Montreal (CRIM)
1801, avenue McGill College, Bureau 800, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2N4, Canada
phone: (514) 398-5561, fax: 514-398-1244, email: hancu@crim.ca